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# A HUNDRED YEARS OF PEACE

BETWEEN THE

# WO GREAT ENGLISH-SPEAKING NATIONS

PRINTED FROM THE PLATES OF

## "THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE UNITED STATES"

A REVIEW OF THEIR RELATIONS IN THE CENTURY OF PEACE
FOLLOWING THE TREATY OF GHENT

By WILLIAM ARCHIBALD DUNNING
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PREPARED AS A PART OF THE CELEBRATION OF THAT CENTENARY

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OR THE USE OF MINISTERS IN THE PREPARATION OF SERMONS APPROPRIATE TO THE CELEBRATION OF THE CENTENARY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE GHENT TREATY OF PEACE ON

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1915

SENT OUT UNDER THE AUSPICES OF

THE FEDERAL COUNCIL OF
THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN AMERICA
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General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. (Southern).

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General Convention of the Disciples of Christ.

National Convention of Baptists.

American Christian Convention.

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# PREFACE

UNDER the happiest auspices and with the hearty co-operation of the leaders of opinion throughout the British Empire and in the United States, plans have been made for an adequate and dignified celebration of the impressive fact that for one hundred years the English-speaking peoples throughout the world have been at peace with one another. The impressiveness of this fact is heightened by the circumstances leading up to and attending the American Revolution and by those which relate to the War of 1812. With the exception of the short contest of 1898 with Spain, which contest had its origin in purely American conditions, the United States has been not only at peace, but usually in the friendliest possible relations with Germany, France, Russia, Italy, and the other nations of continental Europe. On the other hand, there have been many and frequent occasions when public opinion, either in Great Britain or in the United States, or in both, has been deeply stirred by some difference

of view or by some incident of diplomatic controversy. There have been more tempting occasions for misunderstanding and armed conflict between the British Empire and the United States than between the United States and all other nations of the earth combined. The points of contact between the British Empire and the United States are many, and each point of contact is a point of possible friction. Their commercial interests are often in keen rivalry. In times past their territorial ambitions have been in sharp conflict with each other. Notwithstanding, a full hundred years has passed during which war between them has been avoided. This fact is of itself an eloquent testimony to the temper and self-restraint of the English-speaking peoples and a noble tribute to the statesmen who have in succession guided their policies and conducted their international business. The long invisible line which separates the United States and the Dominion of Canada has been left unguarded despite the fact that two energetic, rapidly expanding peoples have been pushing steadily westward on either side of it. This long, invisible, unguarded line is the most convincing testimony that the world has to offer to the ability of modern self-disciplined peoples to keep the

peace. It affords an example which it is not unreasonable to hope may one day be universally followed.

As part of the celebration of one hundred years of peace between the British Empire and the United States, the committees in charge planned a historical review of the relations between the two countries since the signing of the Treaty of Ghent. This delicate and difficult task was committed to William Archibald Dunning, Lieber Professor of History and Political Philosophy in Columbia University, and at the time President of the American Historical Association. With what clearness, cogency, and impartiality Professor Dunning has fulfilled his task the pages that follow amply testify. It has been his purpose to

> ". . . Nothing extenuate,
> Nor set down aught in malice. . . ."

He has made no attempt to minimize or to gloss over the differences that have arisen between the two peoples, the grounds or causes for those differences, or the errors of judgment that may have been committed in attempting to resolve them. The result is a survey of the past century which is full of encouragement

for those who are longing for the day when justice and not force shall rule the destinies of the world. If disputes such as are here traced and recounted can be adjusted without war; if differences of temperament, of ambition, and of interest such as are here described can be settled without armed conflict; if points of honor and of national pride like those here presented can be satisfactorily met without the shedding of innocent human blood, then surely there is no limit to what may be hoped for in the century that is to come. The United States has sedulously followed the earnest injunction of Washington in maintaining friendly relations with all nations while entering into alliance with none. Having been itself carved by revolution from the side of the British Empire, it is but natural that both the bonds of friendship and the causes for jealousy should be more numerous between the United States and the British Empire than between the United States and any other people. This is a plain historical fact which must be accepted by those who guide opinion and who frame public policies.

Friendship, close intercourse, and peace between the English-speaking peoples involve no antagonism to the interests or influence of

other nations. On the contrary, they are but the beginning of a new world order when neither differences of speech, nor of race, nor of creed shall longer be permitted to sow dissension among civilized men, or to arouse human passion to an extent where human reason cannot control it and direct it toward the goal of justice, of human sympathy, and of a peace which is lasting because it rests upon a secure economic and ethical foundation.

NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY,
*June* 4, 1914.



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# INTRODUCTION

That the centenary of the treaty which has secured to Great Britain and the United States one hundred years of unbroken peace should deserve a celebration might seem strange to some philosopher in his study, whose meditations on the folly and cruelty of war would have led him to suppose that peace was natural between two great nations kindred in blood, both highly intelligent and highly civilized. Very different are the feelings of the historian, who remembers how often wars have arisen from slight causes, or of the practical statesman, who knows the kind of motives by which rulers who determine the issues of peace or war have been and still are governed. Jealousies, rivalries, antagonisms have still so much power over peoples, rulers are still so far from trying to apply as between states that moral law which the better sort of individual men recognize in private social and in business intercourse, and which public opinion imposes even upon the worse sort, that the maintenance of peace be-

tween neighbor states through three generations of men is a novel and admirable thing, fit to inspire joy and deserve commemoration.

The peoples of these two states were no doubt of kindred blood. But the quarrels of kinsfolk are proverbially bitter, and between these there were plenty of causes for quarrel. The separation, begun in 1776, sealed by treaty in 1783, had been made by war, a long war, which left angry feelings. The behavior of some of the British forces, and especially of the Hessian mercenaries, had exasperated colonial sentiment, while the harshness with which the revolutionary party among the Americans had treated those of their fellow citizens who adhered to the British Crown had sown the seeds of more enduring anger, especially among those United Empire Loyalists who when expelled from the United States took refuge in Canada. For many years afterward the offensively supercilious attitude of the English and the self-assertive arrogance of the Americans made the average man in each people distasteful to the other, and it was only the wisest and largest minds that preached good understanding and good feeling. These aversions did not die down till the Civil War of 1861–5, with its display of courage and

high spirit on both sides, had brought Europeans to respect the American people, and had given that people itself new martial deeds to be proud of, deeds of a valor which had not been directed against the old country.

Besides these unpleasant memories there were also controversies over important material interests that emerged from time to time. The northeastern frontier of the United States where the State of Maine borders on New Brunswick and Lower Canada had been left uncertain by the treaty of 1783, and also by that of 1814, and as the country began to be settled the disputes over it became threatening. After this question had been disposed of by the Webster-Ashburton treaty of 1842 another boundary quarrel arose for the possession of the region then called Oregon. Each nation had a legal case, and for many months neither seemed likely to give way. Even after the treaty of 1846 had fixed the forty-ninth parallel of latitude as the frontier line all the way to the shores of the Pacific, the diplomatists of both countries were harassed by a dispute relating to the ownership of the island of San Juan in the Straits of Juan de Fuca, and after that dispute had been referred to the German Emperor, and determined by

him in favor of the United States, a larger issue was raised over the frontier of Alaska and that newly colonized extreme northwestern region of Canada which we call the Yukon. This was disposed of by a joint commission in 1903. There still remained one small outstanding controversy about a tiny island, called Pope's Folly, and some fishing-grounds in Passamaquoddy Bay (a large inlet from the Bay of Fundy), through which the international boundary runs. In 1911 an agreement was drafted to refer it to arbitration. When the negotiators, feeling the absurdity of employing the elaborate machinery of a court to determine so trivial a matter, agreed to split the difference, they gave the islet to the State of Maine while the fishing-grounds were assigned to the Canadian province of New Brunswick. With this there ended the long series of frontier questions that had so often been a source of disquiet, and now every yard of the nearly four thousand miles of boundary has been marked out by scientific surveyors. To have escaped or amicably settled all the grounds of friction which might occur along this line, far longer than any other frontier between civilized nations, is itself an event without parallel in history.

Even after the land boundary had been determined, the sea and the creatures that make the value of the sea remained to disturb the repose of the two nations. In the wandering waves one can fix no boundaries, and in the wandering fish one can assert no property, so fishing questions have always been a source of trouble. Questions arose regarding the seal fisheries of the Pacific. Controversies far more intricate and far more protracted produced an almost incessant irritation between the fishermen who came from New England to the coasts of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and the native fishermen who plied their trade there under the British flag. Not till 1910 was this seemingly endless dispute adjusted by the sentence of The Hague tribunal which both parties accepted without a murmur.

The two nations were akin in blood and speech, but a common speech carries with it one disadvantage. Each nation can read all the ill-natured things that are said about it in the other; and there are never wanting those who like to say ill-natured things, sometimes from a vanity which seeks to exalt itself by depressing others, sometimes from a wish to compel attention and produce an effect—for in literature, and espe-

cially in journalism, blame draws more notice than praise—sometimes from pure ill nature, the love of mischief for mischief's sake. Thus, of the many offensive words uttered on both sides when temper was up, a larger proportion reached the eyes and ears of the other than if they had spoken different tongues, and what was spitefully said proved more galling.

There was, moreover, one exception to that community of ideas and traditions which was fitted to draw Americans and Englishmen together. From the third decade of the nineteenth century there had been a considerable immigration from Ireland to the United States. It increased largely after 1845, but it did not begin to be politically significant till the days of the Fenian movement, when some violent members of the insurrectionary party escaped to the United States and placed there their base of operations against the British Government. At the same time they sought to organize and to rouse the Irishmen settled in America, a large and rapidly growing element, against England. Not only the volume of the Irish vote but its compactness, as well as the prominence of Irish leaders in municipal government and in the party machine, made the constant attacks upon

England and the constant pressure upon Congressmen and on successive administrations to adopt an anti-British policy, a factor of some moment. After the remarkable change of British policy toward Ireland which began with Mr. Gladstone's Church Disestablishment Bill of 1869, and reached its high-water mark in his Home Rule Bill of 1886, this anti-English sentiment gradually declined, affecting an always diminishing percentage of that part of the American population which springs from an Irish stock and cherishes an Irish patriotism. It is now confined to a comparatively small section, and is likely soon to disappear. But from the end of the Civil War till about the end of the century it was an obstacle to perfectly good relations, being one of the many ways which Irishmen have found of avenging the wrongs their forefathers suffered at the hands of English governments.

Nevertheless, despite these grounds of dissension and others which need not be here recounted, peace did last unbroken, and, though there were several strains, none came quite to the breaking-point. The times at which the risk of a breach was greatest seem to have been the

dispute about Oregon in 1845, the *Trent* affair in 1861, and the years just after the Civil War (1865 to 1871), when the resentment over the depredations committed by the *Alabama* was acute. The Venezuela incident at the end of 1895 was a passing squall, which the English, astonished at the vehemence shown over a matter which not one Englishman in a hundred had ever heard of, could not be induced to take seriously. In the two former of these instances there was some bellicose sentiment on both sides of the Atlantic, in the two latter such a sentiment existed on the American side only, and few persons in England could imagine war as likely to result.

To what causes, then, do we owe it that all the sources of trouble which from time to time arose, some of which were for the moment formidable, have so passed away that for more than a generation there has been a growing sense of concord and good will?

The cause which naturally occurs to most minds is blood kinship and a common speech. It is, however, easy to overrate the value of such a tie. It has not prevented fierce wars between communities of the same nationality. Athenians and Thebans bore to one another an un-

dying hate. So did Pisans and Florentines. Bitter were the wars between German principalities in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Tocqueville said in 1830 that he could conceive of no hatred more poisonous than that which the Americans then felt for England.[1] Kinship alone would not have been enough. Kinship, however, was reinforced by a sense of the common possession of a great literature and great traditions. The New Englanders, bitter as they often were toward England, could not forget that Milton and Cromwell were Englishmen. Many a Virginian family was proud of its Cavalier ancestry. So too, though it was at one time the fashion among the English upper and literary class to treat the Americans as a purely commercial people, and to disparage their literature, each nation had a genuine interest in the other's performances and a capacity for understanding the other which neither possessed as toward any other people. Each was secretly proud of the other, though neither would avow it. The American masses would from 1814 down to 1871 have felt less repulsion from the notion of armed strife than would the English, but fortu-

[1] One may, however, conjecture that in listening to the sharp words of his New England friends he underrated an underlying sentiment running the other way.

nately there was no standing army in the United States, and only a small navy, so that the country was free from that pernicious influence of a professional military caste which works such frightful evil in Europe, being indeed driven to desire opportunities for practising the work for which the profession exists. In Britain the army and navy never wished to fight America. They would have felt wars with her to be almost civil wars, *bella nullos habitura triumphos*. And when in recent years America began to have a great navy, her officers and sailors, as often as they found themselves in foreign ports, always fraternized with those of British vessels, and found the latter friends ready made.

The basis for good will grew wider and firmer with the increased intercourse of private citizens which followed the introduction of steam navigation. Private friendships became incomparably more numerous, and the interests of commerce were more closely interwoven.

Neither nation was drawn into war by such alliances with any other state as we now see to be among the most deadly sources of war. Happily for herself, America has had no entangling alliances; that risk existed only in 1793–5. Britain, not always so carefully detached, never

has had, and it may safely be said never will have, any that could require her to array herself against America.

But the main factor working for peace has been the good sense and self-control inherent in the character of the two peoples. Neither of them suffers itself to be swept away by passion, neither forgets, even when demagogues seek to excite it by appeals to national vanity and so-called "points of honor," that there are, behind the susceptibilities of the moment, large issues of permanent well-being to be considered. In the days when both nations claimed Oregon, a territory of great extent and value, imperfectly as that value was then known, was in dispute. But in both countries public opinion recognized that the other side also had a case, and that war would be a greater evil than the loss of part of its own rights. The territory was accordingly divided and peace was preserved. So on other occasions also the peoples came near the brink of a rupture, but showed their inborn quality by stopping on the brink.

The question arises—and it is a question of high interest—how much of this self-restraint and underlying wisdom is to be attributed to the fact that the United States Government ever

since 1814 and the British Government ever since 1832 have been popular governments, in which the general feeling of the nation has been, though more evidently in the United States than in Britain, the ultimately decisive factor in international relations. One would like to ascribe much weight to this factor, for it would be reassuring as to the pacific tendencies of democracies in general. But the facts are not all one way. Let us consider them. It is clear that if the government of Britain had been as popular in 1776 as it was in 1876 the North American colonies would not have been alienated as they unhappily were, and also clear that in 1862 the existence of a wide-spread sympathy for the Northern States among the British masses immensely diminished the risk that the British Government might yield to the persuasions of the French Emperor and might thus, in recognizing the independence of the Southern Confederacy, find herself in a conflict with the North.[1] But on every occasion since 1814 in

[1] A well-known writer, General von Bernhardi, observes in his recent book, *Germany and the Next War* (p. 94 of English translation): "England committed the unpardonable blunder, from her point of view, of not supporting the Southern States in the American War of Secession." What the Prussian general calls an "unpardonable blunder" was the scornful refusal of the British nation—a practically unanimous refusal—to take advantage of the divisions in a kindred people and set back the cause of human freedom.

which peace seemed to be threatened from the American side, popular feeling in the United States was, or seemed to be, so far bellicose that the statesmen who directed American policy thought they could make political capital out of a menacing attitude. Such was the case with Mr. Polk and Mr. Seward, and again with Mr. Blaine; and such seemed to be the case with Mr. Cleveland in December, 1895, though the motives with which he launched his message of that year have never been fully understood. If nothing similar happened in Britain, it must be remembered that the questions which arose between the two countries were all (except the *Trent* affair) remote from the knowledge and interest of the great bulk of Englishmen, so that it was never worth the while of any politician, however free from scruples, to win any popular favor by an anti-American policy. Had the controversies which arose over Canadian issues directly affected Britain, or, in other words, had the English been Canadians, defending their view of their rights to disputed territory or to absolute control of sea-fisheries, the temper of the British people might have been more sensitive and their latent pugnacity more easily aroused.

One remarkable proof of good feeling and of a good sense which rises to the level of the highest political wisdom has been of late years given by the people of the United States. There was a time when they desired to complete their control of the North American continent by absorbing Canada. It was a natural desire, for there were geographical considerations which seemed to favor it, and it would, if peaceably effected, have increased their strength and wealth. But never since 1814 have they seriously thought of using force against Canada, for they know that just governments are based on the consent of the governed, while in recent years they have frankly renounced the notion of employing any kind even of a pacific pressure, and have recognized in a large-minded and friendly spirit that Canada has a patriotic ideal of her own and wishes both to become a great nation and to maintain her political connection with the mother-country and those other great dominions which regard the ancient crown of Britain as their centre of unity. In this matter at least let us stop to honor and admire the spirit of American democracy.

He who reads this record which Professor

Dunning has set forth with so much judgment as well as with a conspicuous impartiality, will be struck by the fact that groundless suspicions by either nation of the purposes of the other, and the attribution by either to the other of motives which did not exist or were of slight importance, played no small part in the imbitterment of relations. Such suspicions and misconceptions between states are always to be feared. They have been fruitful sources of strife. That they did not, as between Britain and America, prove fatal in times of strain may be ascribed to the fact that there were always in both nations men capable of correcting these misapprehensions, and that each knew enough of its own defects to be able to make allowances for the like defects in the other. The most serious misapprehension was that which, owing largely to the unwisdom of a section of the English press, arose during the Civil War, when most Americans supposed that a jealous spirit made England desire the downfall of the Republic. That was never the case, as I can venture to assert from my recollection of those now distant days. There was a good deal of sympathy with the valor and constancy of the Confederates. But the fact was, though Amer-

icans did not then know it, that the bulk of the British people, and most of its intellectual leaders, men like John Bright and Goldwin Smith, always stood for the cause which they held to be that of human rights and of democratic progress. During the years from 1861 to 1865 no meetings open to the general public were (so far as I can remember) ever held to give support to the Confederate cause, because it was known that in such an open meeting no resolution adverse to the North could have been carried on a vote. In the upper classes there were then some people who would have liked to see a republic discredited. But the larger heart of the British nation as a whole refused the most favorable opportunity it ever had of injuring its greatest competitor.

Though Professor Dunning is right in dwelling upon the fact that the gradual democratization of Britain tended to the promotion of good relations, it is to be noted that in neither country was either of the great parties identified with either an anti-American or an anti-British tendency. Party politics came but little into the matter. But men, that is to say, the views and characters of individual statesmen, did come in, and made an immense difference.

The portraits of Webster and Ashburton that hang on the walls of the State Department at Washington commemorate two negotiators whose happy co-operation solved a problem the solution of which might, in the hands of lesser men, have been remitted to the sword. On that occasion both the United States and Canada were displeased, the press of each declaring that its representative had conceded far too much. That has almost always been said in both countries alike when any compromise was made. But the outer world and posterity have approved the compromise. Neither American nor British interests were always in the keeping of men so tactful and prudent as Webster and Ashburton. There were moments when the stiff and frigid attitude of the British foreign secretary exasperated the American negotiators, or when a demagogic secretary of state at Washington tried by a bullying tone to win credit as the patriotic champion of national claims. But whenever there were bad manners in London there was good temper at Washington, and when there was a storm on the Potomac there was calm on the Thames. It was the good fortune of the two countries that if at any moment rashness or vehemence was found

on one side, it never happened to be met by the like quality on the other.

The moral of the story which Professor Dunning has told so clearly is that peace can always be kept, whatever be the grounds of controversy, between peoples that wish to keep it. Mr. Root, the greatest of Webster's successors in the office of secretary of state, has well said that there is no issue in diplomacy which cannot be settled if the negotiators sincerely try to settle it. The questions that arose between these two countries were questions in which, especially on the American side, the negotiators could not act without having the mind and will of the people behind them, because the people had some knowledge of the questions, a knowledge far wider than European nations have of the controversies that arise between their governments. The people could exert their judgment, and their judgment, even in moments of excitement, realized how frightful would be the calamities of a fratricidal war.

This feeling has grown immensely stronger within the last half-century, as any one whose recollection extends that far back can testify. It is a guarantee of unbroken peace for the future. May not that sense of an unbreakable

peace have effects going beyond the two nations whom it blesses? They understand one another. The material interests that unite them are greater than ever before, the private friendships more numerous, the reciprocal knowledge of one another more complete. Are they not naturally fitted to act together whenever their efforts can be jointly put forth on behalf of international justice and peace, confirming by their influence the good which their example has already done? They have given the finest example ever seen in history of an undefended frontier, along which each people has trusted to the good faith of the other that it would create no naval armaments; and this very absence of armaments has itself helped to prevent hostile demonstrations. Neither of them has ever questioned the sanctity of treaties, or denied that states are bound by the moral law.

Be that as it may, it is, to those who are saddened by the calamities which the year 1914 has brought upon Europe, a consoling thought that the century of peace which has raised the English-speaking peoples from forty millions to one hundred and sixty millions has created among those peoples a sense of kindliness and

good will which was never seen before, and which is the surest pledge of their future prosperity and progress, as well as of the maintenance of a Perpetual Friendship between them.

JAMES BRYCE.

HINDLEAP, SUSSEX,
*September* 14, 1914.

# THE BRITISH EMPIRE
AND
# THE UNITED STATES

## CHAPTER I

### READJUSTMENT AFTER WAR

In the late afternoon of December 24, 1814, the commissioners who had agreed upon the Treaty of Ghent signed their handiwork and exchanged conventional expressions of satisfaction at the conclusion of their labors. John Quincy Adams, as he tells us in his diary, assured Lord Gambier of his hope that it would be the last treaty of peace between Great Britain and the United States. Two weeks later, at a banquet given by the citizens in honor of the commissioners, Mr. Adams, proposing the culminating toast of the occasion, worded it thus: "Ghent, the city of Peace; may the gates of the temple of Janus, here closed, not be opened again for a century!"

It is not likely that a conscientious search of his heart, such as Mr. Adams was wont to engage in at times, would have revealed any very large measure of the confidence that his formal words had implied. Neither in the course of the negotiations nor in their result could the most sanguine observer have found assurance of even the lesser degree of permanence that had been piously suggested. Actual war between English-speaking peoples the treaty did indeed bring to an end; the causes of the war it did not make the subject of even a remote allusion.

By all the canons of judgment that were warranted by history and by the conditions of the times, the peace made at Ghent could be merely a truce. Great Britain in 1815 stood on the pinnacle of fame as the mightiest political power on earth. Her population of 19,000,000 was not large, relatively speaking, but it was compact. Included in it were some 5,000,000 Irishmen, who, though perpetually troublesome in some respects, could always be depended upon to furnish a goodly quota of both brains and brawn in war. Her navy had established an undisputed control of all the seas. Her army, under Wellington, had given the final blow to

the prestige of the greatest military genius of modern times, if not of all times. Her colonial possessions, largely increased by the twenty years of war just ended, covered vast areas in every part of the globe. Commercially, no other power approached her in the magnitude of her interests. In manufactures she was slowly but surely forging to the front on lines that were soon to revolutionize industry. Politically and socially the forces that made up this mighty organism were centred in a narrow aristocracy. The landowners of the United Kingdom ruled the British Empire. There was indeed a monarch; there was a House of Commons; there were courts and juries and bills of rights and all the elements that had for centuries been the vaunted guarantees of English liberty. In the actual working of the complex system, however, the decisive influence was wielded by the landed aristocracy, and more particularly by the peers whose estates constituted so significant a fraction of the surface of the islands.

The United States, when it ventured to engage in war with this huge empire, presented a contrast with its adversary that was almost ludicrous. A population of 8,000,000, of whom

some 1,500,000 were negro slaves, was scattered along a thousand miles of the Atlantic seaboard, with a few straggling lines of settlement in the Mississippi valley. For military power this nation could boast a dozen half-filled regiments of regular troops, distributed in small detachments over the whole territory, and a navy so insignificant in size as to evoke roars of laughter when the number of its ships was mentioned in the House of Commons. Before the end of the war this minute navy had given such an account of itself as no longer to be a cause of mirth at Westminster, and even the army, after bitter humiliation, had won somewhat of distinction. Yet in no sense could the United States be reckoned as of much significance among the powers of the civilized world. Its foreign commerce had assumed some importance during the long Napoleonic wars, but could expect no great development in the competition with Great Britain after peace had been made. In manufacturing, a little impetus had been given by the exclusion of British goods through embargo and war; but here again the restoration of peace would put the Americans under the crushing weight of competition from England and would end, for the time at least,

any likelihood that the United States would figure among the important industrial powers.

The one aspect in which the American Republic attracted serious attention among enlightened nations was the political and social. Here was to be found in practical operation on a large scale the democracy that the French Revolution had threatened to impose upon all Europe. Liberty and equality of a kind and degree portentously suggestive of the ideals of 1789 and 1792 prevailed throughout the United States and were watched with some anxiety by the dominant classes in the Old World. It was a cardinal maxim of conservative political philosophy in Europe that republican government could not be adapted to the needs of a great territory and population. The career of the American Republic was expected therefore to be stormy and brief. War with the United States in 1812 had not been desired by the British governing aristocracy; it involved an annoying diversion of attention and resources from the serious business of the hour. Only because it might in some measure hasten the inevitable failure and downfall of the American system was it regarded with any equanimity. The attitude of the New England Federalists

during hostilities had confirmed this feeling in the class among whom it prevailed, and the feeling was manifest in the negotiations by which the war was brought to an end.

It would indeed be a serious error to assume that the feeling here referred to was very general in England. Party divisions, though dimmed by the national solidarity that was developed by the exigencies of the long war with France, still marked the line of cleavage in political thinking, and the Whigs, for decades in a hopeless opposition, still bore the tradition of admiration and pride concerning the branch of the English race which Tory policy had severed from the parent stem. Conspicuous features of American constitutional practice were the goal of Whig aspiration and this fact tended to produce tolerance of other features that were abhorrent. Thoroughgoing democracy such as was manifest in the United States was no more attractive to the Whigs than to the Tories. The Tories, however, feared it, while the Whigs looked indulgently upon it as a pathetic error that would in time correct itself. To the Tory the American people was a brawling, disreputable loafer, who had disgraced his family by plundering it and had by his character and

conduct put himself beyond the possibility of toleration by any member of respectable society. The Whig, on the other hand, felt toward the United States much as the upper-class college man feels toward the freshman, the journeyman toward the apprentice, the old and sophisticated in any occupation toward the newcomer. The strong points of the new man were duly appreciated and admired; there was satisfaction that the English-speaking group should include a stout, smart, likely young fellow, and there was shrewd calculation of what he could contribute in a competition or fight with a rival group; but there was a feeling that within his own group he must learn his place and keep it, and must submit peaceably to the hazing and fagging that were the prerogative of his elders.

It was the Tory point of view that dominated the British approach to the negotiations at Ghent. For their temerity in undertaking the conquest of Canada the Americans must be required to surrender enough territory to make a renewal of that enterprise very difficult; and, moreover, they must refrain from all discussion of the practice of search and impressment, which they held to be the cause of the war.

The announcement of these terms by the British commissioners at Ghent suspended negotiation abruptly. Peace on any terms involving cession of territory by the United States was promptly shown by the attitude of the Americans to be impossible; the Britons at the same time were unyielding as to search and impressment. Accordingly, peace pure and simple was agreed to. The Treaty of Ghent embodied, in addition to the articles necessary to end the war, only certain provisions for determining the northern boundary of the United States as fixed by the treaty of 1783, and an agreement to promote the abolition of the slave trade. Matters of grave and pressing importance, the right of search, the navigation of the Mississippi and the Saint Lawrence Rivers, the rights of inshore fishing on the Atlantic coast—all were broached, but were dropped from consideration in order to insure the one great end of peace.

In the United States peace was greeted with universal rejoicing. The chagrin of those in authority at the failure of a far-reaching settlement found no place in popular feeling. In the dazzling glamour of McDonough's victory on Lake Champlain and Jackson's final achievement at New Orleans, the humiliation of De-

troit and Washington and Chrystler's Farm was lost to sight entirely, and the belief hardened into century-long tradition that in a second war for independence the Americans had won as decisive a triumph as that which was crowned at Yorktown.

In Great Britain, meanwhile, the conclusion of peace with the United States was scarcely noted, and the very fact that there had been a war was forgotten. The news that the Treaty of Ghent had been ratified reached London almost simultaneously with the report that Napoleon had returned from Elba. Already for months the progress of affairs at the Congress of Vienna had enlisted the anxious attention of all Europe. Lord Castlereagh, the British foreign secretary, on his way to Vienna with a train of twenty coaches, as John Quincy Adams casually noted, had stopped at Ghent long enough, in August, 1814, to give the British negotiators the instructions that made the conclusion of the treaty possible. The conflicting interests and cross-purposes that were in play at Vienna had made a renewal of widespread war among the great European powers not unlikely; the astonishing reception of Napoleon in France made it practically certain.

In the presence of such a prospect it was not to be expected that the petty affair of American relations should excite any interest. Then followed the Hundred Days, Waterloo, and Saint Helena. These furnished engrossing material for British reflection, both popular and official, and all things American faded from view and from memory.

No such oblivion enveloped the recent events in that group of loyal Britons who dwelt in the provinces north of the United States. Of the half-million inhabitants of these provinces some fifty per cent were English-speaking, and of this fifty per cent the most influential element consisted of the families who had been driven from the United States by the result of the Revolution. New Brunswick and Upper Canada were peopled almost exclusively by these exiles. In them the memories and traditions of the civil strife that had caused them such hardships nourished undying bitterness toward the Americans. Toward the thriving democracy to the south the attitude of the British Canadian was that of the English Tory. When war broke out in 1812, with the loudly proclaimed purpose of Henry Clay and other sanguine spirits to sweep over Canada and dictate

peace at Quebec or Halifax, both French and British subjects rallied faithfully to the colors of the King, but there was a special ardor in the response of the British. Those who recalled the proceedings of the triumphant party in New York and other States at the end of the Revolutionary War could not be lured to welcome the invaders by any call to escape from oppression. It happened that the brunt of the fighting on land fell upon the scattered communities of Upper Canada, where anti-American feeling was strongest, and the loss and suffering inevitable in even minor hostilities were greatest along the shores of Lakes Erie and Ontario and the marvellous river that connects them. This region, destined to become the leading province of the British dominion in America, was permeated thus with the stories of heroic effort, sacrifice, and triumph in resistance to invasion. To the original Loyalist hatred of the American Republic was thus added the confirming force of a patriotic tradition, and no little impulse was given to the influence that was working to develop a proud and prosperous English-speaking state on the northern half of the continent.

That the hope and wish for such a future development were less prevalent in England than

among the Loyalists in Canada is manifest in a remark of Alexander Baring (later Lord Ashburton) to John Quincy Adams in 1816: ". . . it is in vain for us to think of growing strong there [in Canada] in the same proportion as America. . . . He wished the British government would give us Canada at once. It . . . was fit for nothing but to breed quarrels." Baring's pessimistic observation was made in the course of a conversation on the question of disarmament on the Great Lakes, and was premonitory of a feeling among British publicists that was to become wide-spread and notorious by the middle of the century. At the time when Baring's private opinion was revealed and was recorded with grim satisfaction by Adams, the feeling that gave rise to it was probably shared by very few leaders of British policy. Yet the events of the war had served to give the officials of the Colonial Department much uneasiness about the exposed condition of Upper Canada and had thus led to the demand for territorial readjustments that should bar the Americans from the shores of Lakes Erie, Huron, and Superior. The demand was peremptorily rejected, but the purpose behind it remained active. When, therefore,

the peace had been made and the British Government had sufficiently recovered from its Napoleonic distractions to give some attention to American affairs, it came to pass, happily enough, that the situation on the frontier of Upper Canada was the first of the many disturbing questions at issue that was satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy.

The work of the diplomats on the problems left unsettled by both the war and the treaty of peace was begun in the middle of 1815, with the negotiation of a convention of commerce and navigation at London. John Quincy Adams, Clay, and Gallatin wrestled again with the Britons who had been at Ghent, but made no progress toward securing for the United States the eagerly sought privileges of trade with the British-American colonies. The treaty signified practically nothing beyond the formal resumption of reciprocal commerce as it had existed before the war, the East Indies becoming again the only transmarine dependencies of Great Britain with which American vessels were permitted to carry on trade.

The matter of the armaments on the Great Lakes was formally entered upon diplomatically only at the beginning of 1816. Under instruc-

tions from Washington, John Quincy Adams, now minister of the United States at London, proposed to Lord Castlereagh that both governments set a limit to their respective naval forces on the Lakes. The actual situation there had given much concern to American and British authorities alike. The termination of hostilities came in the midst of energetic efforts by the commanders on both sides of the frontier to complete and equip new and larger vessels. Especially on Lake Ontario, where the superiority of the Americans was less clearly established than elsewhere, the rivalry in naval construction was most energetic and ambitious. The primitive processes by which a few acres of forest had been turned almost overnight into fleets of small but sufficient war-ships were now being developed and extended to more pretentious designs. At Kingston, on the Canadian side, Sir James Yeo was pressing toward completion one ship-of-the-line that should mount 110 guns and two that should mount 74, and across the lake at Sacketts Harbor two rival 74's were on the stocks. Many lesser craft were in various stages of construction. The cessation of hostilities naturally did not end the strenuous rivalry. The same reason-

ing that was destined a century later to fill the oceans and the scrap-heaps of all the world with gigantic masses of steel, operated to keep at full tension the workers on the puny wooden structures that embodied the hope of triumphant sea-power in the earlier day. Only when the actual strain on the finances of the governments overcame the care for a contingent future of naval glory, was a halt called in the extravagant proceedings on the Lakes.

The proposition of Adams for disarmament met with no satisfactory response at first from Lord Castlereagh. His Lordship freely admitted the ruinous consequences that were threatened by the competition in fleet-building, but urged that, because Great Britain was at a great disadvantage as compared with the United States in respect to facilities for defensive equipment in that remote region, any restriction of force should apply to the Americans only. The truth was that the British cabinet were seriously divided on the policy to be pursued in this matter. A party headed by Lord Bathurst, the colonial secretary, insisted that an overwhelming naval force should be created on the Lakes, so as to render forever out of the question any American aggression upon Upper

Canada. Demands for this policy were strongly urged in both Parliament and the press during the winter and spring of 1816, and gave Adams much anxiety. Ultimately, however, the belligerent faction was overcome by the pacifists of the government, and Adams, much to his surprise, was informed by Castlereagh in April that the proposal for disarmament would be taken up for discussion.

The detailed discussion of the business was transferred to Washington, where it was handled by Monroe, the secretary of state, and Bagot, the British minister. Final action was not reached without considerable delay. On both sides of the water there prevailed in military and naval circles, and was reflected in the press, the usual post-bellum irritation and bluster, making the diplomats cautious. Adams reported his fear that the sudden change in Castlereagh's attitude concealed some treachery, and Bagot was suspicious of an ulterior motive behind Monroe's earnestness in seeking a settlement. All the clouds were dissipated, however, and at the end of April, 1817, a formal agreement was effected by an exchange of notes at Washington. By this date Monroe had become President of the United States, and

the State Department was under the charge of Richard Rush, pending the return from abroad of the new secretary, John Quincy Adams. The notes were signed, therefore, by Rush and Bagot respectively, and the arrangement embodied in them became known as the Rush-Bagot Agreement. By its terms each government bound itself to limit its naval force on the frontier to four vessels, each not exceeding one hundred tons burthen and armed with one 18-pound cannon, one vessel to be stationed on Lake Ontario, two on the Upper Lakes, and one on Lake Champlain. All other war-ships on these lakes were to be forthwith dismantled, and no others were to be there built or armed.

In conformity with this arrangement the British authorities disposed of their three ships-of-the-line, six medium-sized vessels, and many smaller craft, while the Americans dismantled, sold, or scuttled and sank a number considerably larger. So long as the good faith of the two governments endured, it was thus insured that the Great Lakes should be free from the martial ardor that is inevitably inspired by the parade of rival forces. The future was to show that even more important than this direct influence was the indirect effect of the adjustment

in setting the standard of peaceful methods for the determination of the vexatious problems that arose along the whole long boundary between the United States and British America.

The comprehensive consideration of the questions at issue between the United States and Great Britain in connection with the late war was taken up in 1817 at London. Two years of general peace had by this time cleared up many cloudy matters of domestic and foreign politics and the British cabinet could devote some leisurely attention to the issues which the Americans were so insistent on bringing forward for settlement. It could not be said that the slow progress toward a settlement was due to any ill feeling on the part of the British Government toward the United States. So far as Castlereagh's conduct at the Foreign Office was concerned, not even John Quincy Adams, temperamentally indisposed to approval of an adversary, could find much to criticise, while Richard Rush, who in 1817 succeeded Adams as minister at London, positively and warmly proclaimed the conciliatory disposition of the secretary. Charles Bagot was sent to Washington with imperative instructions to promote cordial relations with the American Govern-

ment, and his success in accomplishing this was understood to be the condition of his future advancement in his diplomatic career. He did not anticipate much pleasure from his task. He was an intimate of George Canning, whose antipathy to Castlereagh and all his works made much scandal in the circles of the ruling aristocracy. "Your plan of treatment," wrote Canning to Bagot just after his appointment in 1815, "may or may not succeed with the Yankees, but it is obviously, for your sake, the proper one. I am afraid, indeed, that the question is not so much how you will treat them as how they will treat you, and that the hardest lesson which a British Minister has to learn in America is not what to do, but what to bear. But even this may come round. And Waterloo is a great help to you, perhaps a necessary help after the (to say the least) balanced successes and misfortunes of the American war."

Despite all the obstacles, however, Bagot succeeded in his undertaking. Though he was fully impressed with the fact that ill feeling toward Great Britain was a controlling influence in the predominant party in the country, he was tactful and far-sighted enough to establish at Washington the same official cordiality that

Rush reported at London. Under such favorable conditions the negotiations that were intended to define the results of the war proceeded to a conclusion in the treaty that was signed at London October 20, 1818.

This convention fell far short of what the Americans had hoped for. Its omissions were almost as significant as those of the Treaty of Ghent. In particular, there was no reference to the right of search and impressment. This subject had naturally been put first in importance of the long list on which Rush was instructed to seek an agreement. His efforts revealed at the very outset, so far as the fundamental principle at issue was concerned, the same hopeless *impasse* that had existed for twenty years. Great Britain stood absolutely immovable on her right to search foreign merchantmen on the high seas for British seamen; the United States declared categorically that she would never admit the right of any foreigner to muster the crew of an American vessel on their own ship. In view of this unpromising antagonism on fundamental principle, the negotiations made a degree of progress that was highly significant of the conciliatory spirit on both sides. Castlereagh freely conceded that

the practice of visitation and search by the British commanders had been attended with serious abuses, and he was ready to do everything possible to prevent their recurrence. Rush ultimately agreed that the best way to attain this end was to keep British seamen out of American ships. Accordingly, a draft treaty was actually formulated in which Great Britain abandoned the visitation of American ships except for purposes recognized by both governments as justifiable by international law, while the United States undertook to exclude from service in its merchant marine all natural-born subjects of Great Britain, even those who should in the future become American citizens under the naturalization laws.

This project eventually was dropped, on account of disagreements on subsidiary points concerning ratification and administration. It probably involved rather too large concessions for the time and circumstances on both sides. America had already become as tenacious of her claim concerning the rights of her naturalized citizens as Britain was concerning the right of her navy to recruit its forces wherever it could find British seamen. The points on which the treaty came to grief were so rela-

tively insignificant as strongly to suggest that they were merely a cover for retreat from a too advanced position on the main questions. Whatever was the truth in this matter, the failure of the project left active a serious menace to the peace of the two nations. The peril was destined to endure until the progress of ideas had undermined the British conviction that the brutal practice of impressment was the only adequate means by which to insure naval pre-eminence, and until the growth and prestige of the United States had made respect for her claims as to the rights of her citizens a necessity in practice if not in theory.

Of the subjects on which agreement was actually embodied in the convention of 1818, the majority involved relations between the United States and the British possessions to the north of it. Most important was the adjustment of the differences as to the fisheries on the Atlantic coast. By the treaty of peace in 1783 Great Britain recognized the right of the people of the United States to take fish on the banks of Newfoundland, in the Gulf of Saint Lawrence, and at sea in general, and further accorded the "liberty" of fishing on practically all the coasts, bays, and creeks of

British America, with the additional "liberty" of drying and curing fish on certain unsettled parts of the shore. By these provisions a prominent American industry was made very prosperous and profitable. The excessive generosity of the British negotiators was severely criticised by their compatriots on both sides of the Atlantic. At Ghent, in 1814, there was an opportunity to correct the error of the earlier treaty. Accordingly, the British commissioners took the position that, under a familiar principle of international law, the fisheries article of 1783, like all the rest of that convention, had been abrogated by war between the signatory governments. The Americans were fully equipped with reasons why this principle did not apply to the fisheries article. The debate reached no conclusion, however, on account of the agreement to treat of peace only.

After hostilities ceased friction naturally arose in the fishing regions. The Americans resumed their accustomed pursuit of the herring and cod in the accustomed places; the British authorities in the Maritime Provinces manifested a purpose to protect their coast from the intrusion of the Americans. A zealous naval commander even warned an American fisherman

who was plying his vocation out of sight of land not to venture to do so within sixty miles of the shore. Protests on these incidents evoked from the British Foreign Office at last the formal declaration that it claimed no right to interfere with fishing on the high sea, but that it would treat as extinct the liberty once recognized to Americans to take and cure fish on any British coasts or bays. It was obviously high time for serious effort to remove so disagreeable a situation as was thus created.

In the negotiations on the subject the case of the Americans was almost hopeless. The inshore privileges long enjoyed were vital to the prosperity of a great industry that centred in Massachusetts. To maintain these privileges, however, it was necessary to sustain two contentions that were desperately weak, namely, that the "liberty" accorded by the treaty of 1783 was in reality a right under the law of nature and of nations, and that this liberty or right had not been abrogated by the war. Gallatin and Rush, the American plenipotentiaries, as well as Secretary Adams, who directed them, were adepts in the diplomatist's art of extracting from the hazy realms of nature and history the particular principle or prece-

dent that happened to be useful to their cause; but their skill availed little against the stiff British dogma that territorial jurisdiction was absolute as against the claims of any foreign power, especially one that had recently failed of success in war.

The result, however, in the actual treaty provisions was more favorable to the American interests than had *prima facie* seemed possible. Great Britain again made substantial concessions. The liberty of inshore fishing was assured forever to the inhabitants of the United States on certain limited stretches of British coast, namely, in Newfoundland, the whole western shore and an important piece of the southern; in Labrador, from a designated point in the Gulf of Saint Lawrence eastward and northward indefinitely; and all the shores of the Magdalen Islands. In Labrador and the south of Newfoundland drying and curing fish on shore was also permitted. Besides the solid gain contained in these provisions, the American commissioners flattered themselves that they had saved their face in the very terms in which the fishing privileges were abandoned as to all the other British coasts. "And the United States hereby renounce forever any liberty

heretofore enjoyed or claimed" as to fishing within three miles of coasts, bays, creeks, or harbors outside of the foregoing limits. This wording was held to imply that the inshore privileges recognized in the treaty were not newly granted or ever *granted* by Great Britain, but were part of a natural heritage possessed by the United States, of which another and larger part was voluntarily renounced.

It is interesting to notice that, despite the meticulous care which the Americans devoted to the phrasing of the article, with a view to its more or less metaphysical implications, there remained in it the germ of a long and vexatious dispute on a most practical point of interpretation. Within twenty years of the signing of the treaty the British Government took the position that the "bays" from which the Americans were excluded embraced great expanses of deep sea where fishermen could ply their vocation on the largest scale without coming within three miles of the shore. If any one concerned in the negotiation of the treaty in 1818 suspected the possibility of such a view, he left no record of his insight.

In addition to the settlement as to the fisheries, this treaty dealt with the delimitation of

territory from the Lake of the Woods to the Pacific Ocean. No serious controversy developed over this matter, not because the views of the two parties were entirely harmonious, but because the occupation of the vast wilderness concerned was as yet on too limited a scale to raise any immediate issue. From the Lake of the Woods to the summit of the Rocky Mountains it was easily agreed that the forty-ninth degree of latitude should be the boundary. As no one knew the position of the lake with reference to the parallel, but all felt sure that a meridian from the lake would cross the parallel somewhere, it was provided that from the northwestern point of the lake a north and south line should be run, if necessary, to intersect the parallel, and this line, with the parallel, should mark the boundary. West of the Rocky Mountains, however, the Oregon country, with its great rivers and its long and much indented Pacific coast, presented problems and possibilities of such obvious magnitude that neither party was especially eager to press for a definitive adjustment till fuller knowledge was forthcoming. Both British and American merchants had established fur-trading stations on the coast, and from the opposite direction

the Oregon country had been penetrated by the hardy and enterprising agents of great commercial interests centring respectively at Saint Louis and Montreal. All that was provided by the treaty was that the whole region, so far as claimed by either Great Britain or the United States, should for ten years be free and open to the vessels, citizens, and subjects of the two powers.

The most satisfactory feature of the convention of 1818, so far as concerned delimitation of territory, was the provision by which a thousand miles of the boundary was made dependent upon the fairly certain mechanical processes of the surveyor. An astronomical line will indeed vary with the personality of the men and the precision of the instruments employed in determining it, but it is certainty itself as compared with most other customary means of demarcation. *A priori* one might suppose that geographical features, such as rivers and mountains, fixed by nature beyond the ordinary power of man to change, would furnish the most satisfactory boundaries. Experience has proved, however, that this is very far from the truth. Not until the present century, when almost every mile of the thousands in North

America where British and American possessions are contiguous has been marked by monuments erected by human hands, have controversies over territorial limits been set finally at rest.

At the time when the convention of 1818, by the provision for the joint occupation of Oregon, postponed a dangerous dispute concerning the western side of the continent, a serious but unsuccessful effort was in progress to adjust a threatening difference at the far eastern end of the line. The treaty of peace in 1783 had been singularly unsuccessful in the attempt to make clear the northern boundary of the United States. Difficulties in running the line made their appearance all the way from the Atlantic Ocean to the Lake of the Woods. The starting-point was set forth with much apparent particularity in the treaty: "From the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, *viz.*, that angle which is formed by a line drawn due north from the source of Saint Croix River to the Highlands; along the Highlands which divide those rivers which empty themselves into the river Saint Lawrence, from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean, to the northwesternmost head of Connecticut River . . ." But no one knew

or ever discovered the whereabouts of the "northwest angle of Nova Scotia"; the "Highlands" referred to could not be identified; the rivers "which fall into the Atlantic Ocean" might or might not include those that reached their destination by way of the great gulfs and bays that abounded in the neighborhood, and much depended on which alternative was selected; the "northwesternmost head of the Connecticut River" was doubtful and undetermined. Most important of all at the outset, moreover, was the fact that the two governments disagreed as to what stream was meant by the Saint Croix River. As the middle of this river, from mouth to source, completed, in the treaty, the long circuit of the boundary as there described, and separated Maine from New Brunswick, it early became imperative to settle on the identity of the Saint Croix. Only after fifteen years of controversy was an agreement reached. In 1798 a joint commission provided for in Jay's Treaty found that the Schoodic River was what the treaty meant by the Saint Croix, and determined by survey its mouth and its source.

This was the limit of the progress made prior to the War of 1812. In the Treaty of Ghent

the boundary question was taken up in earnest, and three distinct commissions were provided for, with recourse to arbiters in case of disagreement between the commissioners.

The whole undetermined line from the Atlantic to the Lake of the Woods was parcelled out to these bodies for final survey and indication. Only one of the commissions was successful in its task: the course of the line among the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay and the Bay of Fundy was agreed upon without much trouble. At the other end of the boundary, between Lake Huron and the Lake of the Woods, some points were presented on which the commissioners could not reach an agreement, but no pressing necessity for a settlement arose. The task of the third commission, namely, to run the line from the head of the Saint Croix to the point where the Saint Lawrence is intersected by the forty-fifth parallel of north latitude, proved to be wholly beyond its power. The commissioners toiled for five years, from 1816 to 1821, only to reach a hopeless disagreement. As the "northwest angle of Nova Scotia" the opinions of the two commissioners designated respectively points that were 105 miles apart; their views as to the "highlands," etc., left a

region of over ten thousand square miles in dispute on the frontier of Maine and New Brunswick; and further the discovery was made, much to the discomfort of the Americans, that what had for fifty years passed for the forty-fifth parallel and served as the boundary between New York and Vermont on the one side and Canada on the other, was in fact so far from the true parallel as to leave on British soil a costly fortress under construction by the United States at Rouse's Point.

The progress of settlement and development made this situation a cause of great concern to the two governments. Arbitration was arranged in 1827 and the King of the Netherlands was chosen as umpire. His opinion, pronounced in 1831, frankly declared the impossibility of deciding which, if either, of the conflicting claims conformed to the terms of the treaty of 1783, and proposed a line that divided the region in dispute. This proposal was not accepted by either government, and the matter remained to be the source of ever-increasing friction, as we shall see, until 1842.

If the character of their formal diplomatic intercourse were a conclusive criterion of the general feeling of two nations toward each other,

cordial respect and friendship would be said to have prevailed between Great Britain and the United States in the years immediately following the end of the war. Even when, as in regard to the right of search, differences of view were obstinate and irreconcilable, the debate had involved no display of bitterness. All the negotiations had been correct and amicable according to the most exacting requirements of the diplomatist's art. The technique of this art, however, consists largely in devices through which good manners shall cover feelings of quite another sort. A model plenipotentiary may be an indifferent index of the national spirit which he represents. Like the second in an affair of honor, he must guide his principal along the lines of the established proprieties, however deeply he may sympathize with the principal's impulse to slay the adversary out of hand. In the period with which we are dealing there is no room for doubt that the statesmen chiefly concerned with Anglo-American relations regarded one another with sincere respect, and were earnest in their desire for harmony between the peoples. They were all aware, at the same time, of deep feelings and powerful interests on both sides of the Atlantic that worked inces-

santly in the opposite direction. In 1818, in the midst of the negotiations for the convention of that year, a disconcerting illustration of this fact was brought before the public by the proceedings of the American general Andrew Jackson on the Spanish soil of Florida.

In the United States the most particular abode of hostility to all things British was the valley of the Mississippi—the frontier region where population was sparse but now rapidly growing. Of the causes which nourished this hostility, the most active was probably the traditional relations between the British and the Indians in both the Northwest and the Southwest. Practically every village and settlement between the mountains and the Mississippi contained inhabitants who had suffered personally from the ghastly incidents of savage warfare. That the Indians who butchered and burned and scalped throughout the West had been systematically inspired and sustained in their acts and methods by British authorities, was an ingrained conviction among the American people. The open alliance of the army in Canada with Tecumseh during the late war confirmed this conviction for generations. Long after the war, Indian bands from the remoter regions of the

Northwest made annual pilgrimages to Malden, the Canadian garrison town across the river from Detroit, and there received the long-customary gifts from the commander. The American authorities in Michigan viewed this proceeding with much anxiety and protested to Washington against its continuance. It was firmly believed by many in the United States, including so hard-headed a personage as John Quincy Adams, that the continued distribution of gifts to the Indians was deliberately calculated to insure the support of the savages in future hostilities.

In the southern part of the United States the Creek Indians, during the war with Great Britain, had, more or less under the inspiration of Tecumseh, opened war of the usual kind on the whites. The ruthless energy of Andrew Jackson soon crushed the savages, many of whom sought safety across the boundary in Florida, where Spanish authority held feeble sway. So feeble was this sway that a British force had ventured to occupy Pensacola, the capital of the province, as a base of operations against the Americans. Jackson pursued his Indian foes into Florida, and did not abandon Spanish territory till he had captured Pensacola and driven the British force out of the

neighborhood. The utter inability of Spain to maintain a semblance of effective sovereignty in Florida was made perfectly clear by these events. After the peace of Ghent her weakness continued to be manifested in the threatening activities of hostile Indians, runaway slaves, and many varieties of outlaws along the American frontier. The Spanish governor, in reply to complaints, acknowledged that he could not keep these people in order. In 1817 Seminole Indians attacked United States troops on the border and Jackson, with the prestige of success in the defence of New Orleans about him, was sent to take charge of the situation. His procedure was characteristic. He marched straight into Florida, scattering the Indians as he advanced, and seized the Spanish town of Saint Mark's. Among the captives taken here was a substantial trader named Arbuthnot, a British subject, whose home was the island of Nassau. He was well known to the American commander as a man of influence with the Indians, and as one who believed that the Seminoles had been unjustly treated by the United States. Garrisoning Saint Mark's, Jackson set out for the chief town of the Seminoles, a hundred miles away, but on reaching it after a dif-

ficult march, found it deserted, and thus was unable to deliver the crushing blow that he had planned. From a white man whom he captured he discovered that a letter from Arbuthnot had warned the Indians of the impending danger and prompted their escape. Robert Ambrister, an employee of Arbuthnot and also a British subject, was captured in the vicinity of the Indian town. All the circumstances seemed to Jackson to call for summary proceedings. Returning to Saint Mark's, he brought the luckless Britons before a court martial, convicted them of various offences under the laws of war, and had Arbuthnot hanged and Ambrister shot.

The doughty general's vigor did not end with these achievements. A little later he felt obliged to go and capture Pensacola again, and teach the Spanish governor the error of his ways. This incident was not necessary, however, to set the wheels of international controversy in motion; they were spinning at top speed already. The summary execution of two British subjects by an American general at a place where the right of the victims to be secure was more apparent than the right of the commander to be at all, caused a great explosion of wrath in

England. At the very first reports of what had occurred, the press flamed with demands for the vindication of Britain's outraged honor. The cabinet were much embarrassed to refrain from serious action before the arrival of full and official information as to the affair. War might have been brought about, Castlereagh later told Rush, "if the ministry had but held up a finger." When all the facts were known, however, the government was fully justified in its caution; for on the evidence submitted it was obliged to admit that Arbuthnot and Ambrister had by their relations with the Indians forfeited the right to protection by the British Government against the military power of the United States. Jackson's high-handed proceedings in Florida were in the long run more violently assailed in his own country than abroad. The Monroe administration only with much difficulty agreed upon sustaining him, and rival politicians in Congress attacked him without mercy. Popular feeling, however, especially in the West, was enthusiastically in his favor, and eventually made him President of the United States. Not least among the influences that worked to bring him this distinction was the wide-spread tradition that in executing Arbuth-

not and Ambrister he had deliberately flouted and defied Great Britain.

The correct and friendly attitude of the British Government was manifested in other incidents during this period. Even on so stubbornly contested a point as the right of search Rush had reason to believe that an agreement would have been reached if Castlereagh had been able to remain in personal supervision of the negotiations. The foreign secretary was called away to the Continent at a critical stage of the discussion, after having given very clear indications of his individual disposition to go far in yielding. In the negotiation of the treaty of commerce, also, Frederick John Robinson, the chief British representative, intimated a feeling that the American demands were too early in time rather than too objectionable in substance to be conceded.

It was inherent in the general condition of world politics that America should be seeking new things and Great Britain should be standing by the old. Especially was this the case in regard to commerce and navigation. The newcomer among maritime powers found herself barred in every direction from profitable trade by the existing system under which every

nation protected its own merchants and shipping interests by excluding foreigners from its jurisdiction save under heavy burdens. To the Americans it seemed something like a violation of natural justice that they should be forbidden to sell a cargo of goods in Halifax or Jamaica; yet such was British law. It was hard to question the right of a government to exclude foreigners from its ports; but the desperate eagerness of the Americans for certain kinds of trade led them at times to take the ground that freedom of commercial intercourse was so profoundly an interest of all mankind as fairly to be within the domain of natural law. Such a trend of argument could, of course, have no practical effect in any concrete case; the British, entrenched in commanding commercial sites all over the globe, could and did merely inquire what the Americans could offer for the privileges they sought. Bargaining of the kind thus suggested was a very unsatisfactory process where there was such disparity between the two parties in actual possessions. It was like the freedom of contract in a later day that was alleged to be a sufficient principle on which to base the relations of wage-earner and wage-payer.

In the treaty of commerce and navigation of 1815, which was, as stated above, a recurrence to ante-bellum conditions, there was one provision that proved to be influential in breaking down the ancient system of commercial restriction. For the first time on record, two nations agreed by treaty to abandon the recourse to discriminating duties, Great Britain limiting her concession to her European territories. Commodities produced in these territories and the United States respectively were to pay as favorable customs duties as were paid by the products of any other nation, and tonnage duties were to be precisely the same on British and American ships in the ports of both powers. As discrimination in duties was a favorite means of carrying out the old restrictive policy, this reciprocal concession of equality was a distinct step toward a different system. It became, in fact, a model for a long line of later conventions by which the nations advanced in the path of commercial freedom. The treaty of 1815 was tentative only, being limited by its terms to four years. It was renewed for ten years by the treaty of 1818, and later was renewed indefinitely.

It is not to be gainsaid that the motive of

the powers in promoting as they did the cause of freedom of commerce was mainly a shrewd calculation of immediate self-interest rather than any devotion to an abstract ideal. Equally beyond question is it that the ideals that pervaded the intellectual atmosphere of the day were wholly adverse to the old system. After the Napoleonic storm had subsided, doctrines that had played a large part in producing the French Revolution, but had been driven to cover by the course taken by that convulsion, began to assume prominence in England. The economic theories of Adam Smith and the legal and political dogmas of Jeremy Bentham won adherents if not yet respectability. These systems, in all their implications, were hostile to the existing institutions of Great Britain. Underlying both philosophies was the conception of man as a free and intelligent being, working out, each individual for himself, the mode and content of his welfare. British commerce and industry were based upon a complex of regulations and restrictions designed to favor particular kinds of business and special classes of people; and the government which distributed the favor was itself controlled by a particular business and a special class of people.

Between the two political parties, Tory and

Whig, the only important difference was as to what interests and classes should be preferred; neither contemplated a political or economic system in which preference should have no place. This latter idea found expression, however, through the radical reformers who began about 1820 to exert a perceptible influence on British thought. Between that date and 1850 a far-reaching transformation was effected in economic and political conditions, chiefly by the Whigs. Much as this party detested the Radicals, the general character of the reforms that it effected followed the lines laid out by the acute reasoning of the Benthamite school—the two Mills, Ricardo, Grote, Joseph Hume, Austin, and Molesworth.

In America the conditions which the British approached as far-distant ideals were conspicuous facts. Within the vast region controlled by the United States commercial and industrial freedom was complete. No legal barriers restricted a man's choice among the opportunities for self-betterment that beckoned in every direction. Whether he devoted his energies to farming or to manufacturing or to trade was determined solely by his judgment as to the profit to be expected; and what he should raise on his farm, what he should make in his workshop, or to whom he

should sell the products of his labor, was a question to be settled by no different criterion. Politically, the freedom of the individual was only less complete. Property qualifications for the suffrage and for holding office generally prevailed, but were of consequence only in the eastern States. In the growing West, where differences of wealth were as slight and rare as all other marks of social inequality, distinctions in political rights were from the outset unknown in fact and were early banished from the law.

Thus it was true that despite the enormous differences between the two great societies of English-speaking people, a subtle force was operating to bring them together. Every step in Great Britain toward breaking down the ancient system of privilege and restriction was an approach, however unintended, toward the democratic ideal. Every step in the United States toward national consolidation involved such development and fostering of special interests, however reluctantly, as to limit perceptibly the *laissez-faire* individualism of the democratic fact. The progress of the two nations in the indicated directions was made very manifest in the history of their internal development during the decades of the thirties and the forties.

# CHAPTER VIII

## CONCLUSION

The discussion of international relations is almost invariably tainted with the fallacy of too sweeping generalization. This is as true of historical as of argumentative discussion. It has been copiously illustrated in the events narrated in the preceding chapters. It may doubtless be found illustrated by the narrative itself; for the vice inheres in the very structure and function of language. A crisis or a policy of vital import to the English-speaking peoples has more than once had its origin in some jaunty judgment that Great Britain despised the United States, or that Canada was enamoured of annexation, or that America hated the English, when in truth the emotions referred to could be predicated only of some individual or group in the respective nations. The editor of the London *Times* or *The Saturday Review* has been taken for Great Britain, Goldwin Smith for Canada, and any one of a dozen

politicians of Celtic extraction or sympathies for America. These and similar identifications have figured largely in the historical writings of the century, with distracting results. There has been on the whole overemphasis on the evidences of ill feeling among the English-speaking peoples. The influence of the episodes that gave rise to diplomatic friction has been exaggerated. Forces that worked unceasingly and powerfully for good feeling have been ignored. An ingrained diplomatic policy, a strong and popular personality, an expedient of party strategy or a demand of an insistent economic interest has been treated as a conclusive index of the national spirit, whereas such spirit is justly discoverable only in a careful synthesis of these elements. Surveyed with proper reference to this fact, our review of the century of peace may be summarized as follows:

The hundred years fall into four fairly well distinguishable periods. In the first, 1814–1835, the key to Anglo-American relations is to be found in Great Britain's foreign policy in Europe and her internal politics. In the second, 1836–1860, the controlling feature is the growth of the United States in population and territory. The third, 1861–1885, takes its character

from the American Civil War. The fourth, 1886–1914, turns on the projection of American and British interests and influence beyond the bounds of the United States and the United Kingdom.

In the first period there was a gradual progress from the bitterness that the war made intense in America and Canada to a condition of general amity. The Treaty of Ghent put an end to flagrant war; it did little or nothing for the promotion of lasting peace. It did not weaken the conviction in the minds of many Americans that a leading principle of British policy was to bully and dragoon the United States into a condition of dependence as near as possible to that which had been thrown off in 1776; it did not extinguish the fear among the English in Canada that the United States was resolutely bent on conquering and annexing them; it did not qualify the belief widespread among the ruling aristocracy in England that the American democracy was a barbarous, brawling political organism, whose growth was to be restricted by all possible means in the interest of civilization. For each of these various beliefs there was not lacking a certain foundation in fact; and the progress toward

amity was measured by the transformation of the facts.

The diplomacy of this period made some important contributions to the perpetuation of the peace secured at Ghent. The Rush-Bagot arrangement was the chief of them. An influential element of American opinion was conciliated by the limited access to the inshore fisheries conceded by Great Britain in 1818, though the concession embodied potentialities of trouble. So far as the Monroe Doctrine may be regarded as a product of diplomacy, it must stand high in the records of this period. Whether its function was pacific, or ever will be so, is doubtful. At the time of its announcement, however, it unquestionably promoted good feeling between the British and the American peoples. A like effect was produced by the modification in commercial policy through which the bars were let down for the American traders in the West Indies. On the other side was felt throughout the period the exasperating operation of the failure to get together on the right of search and in respect to the northeastern boundary of the United States. No amount of concession by the British Government on other points could keep down the

American's gorge at the thought that the right was still claimed to inflict on American vessels and seamen the humiliations that were common before 1815. This feeling in the United States and the irritation in Canada and New Brunswick over what was felt to be the unfounded claims of the Americans as to the boundary were the chief factors of popular ill feeling that survived to the end of this first period. The spectacular triumphs of the Whigs over the Tories in the United Kingdom tended greatly to reduce the springs of animosity among the Americans in reference to the British in general.

Our second period began with trouble, and trouble among the English-speaking peoples was continuous almost to the end. There was insurrection in Canada and exasperating border incidents. The northeastern boundary produced a grist of friction and popular excitement. Antislavery authorities in the British West Indies took doubtful liberties with American slaves and ships. The singular sequence of serious controversies dissipated the general friendliness and introduced a persistent condition of distrust and acrimony. Webster and Ashburton succeeded in settling the north-

eastern boundary and some other points of contention, but many were left, including the right of search. The American democracy was fully embarked on its career of expansion. Led by the men of the mighty West, it proceeded to realize its "manifest destiny" in Texas, in Oregon, and in California. Half the total coast of the Gulf of Mexico and half the total Pacific coast of North America were the modest limits of its demands. Great Britain, congenital mistress of the seas and sovereign over Canada and the Hudson's Bay Company, had necessarily to take notice of these proceedings. She saved part of Oregon, but her projects for Texas and California gave way before the resolute aggression of Polk. Through the war with Mexico the United States realized its alleged destiny. In the very month in which peace was concluded the golden secret of the Sierras was disclosed at Sutter's Mill, and the adventurous of all the earth started for California. At once the Central American isthmus became one of the greatest highways of the world, and as promptly appeared the clash between British and American claims and interests in Nicaragua. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and ten years of harassing negotia-

tion to determine what it meant, followed this development.

The events on which these two decades of diplomacy turned were replete with incidents that stirred the passions of the peoples and made much bad blood between them. At the same time other events in the national life of all concerned worked clearly for friendship and good feeling. Free trade became the commercial policy of both Great Britain and the United States. The whole democratic spirit of Cobden and Bright became influential in British politics and won the approval of Americans. Palmerston's foreign policy after 1848, whatever its inconsistencies, was at least favorable to the Liberals of the Continent. In this again American opinion was conciliated. The exiled heroes of unsuccessful revolt on the Continent—Kossuth, Garibaldi, Schurz—found equal welcome in England and the United States; and those who gave the welcome could not but feel drawn to each other. Common sympathy with Magyars and Italians and Germans tended somewhat to counteract the effect of the wide divergence of sympathies in respect to the Irish. Canadians and Americans, whose antipathies rose high at the be-

ginning of this period, were at its close once more on cordial terms through the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854. There was indeed, in 1860, a general spirit of trans-Atlantic friendliness among the English-speaking peoples, to which the visit of the youthful Prince of Wales in the United States and Canada was a witness. The American Republic itself was, however, permeated with the animosities of the sections, and the fiercest antipathies that ever divided English-speaking peoples were about to be manifested in the conflict between North and South.

The period of the American Civil War was one of utter distraction, as to both feeling and convictions, among the English-speaking peoples. From the outset there was in both the warring sections as much fear and distrust of Great Britain as hatred of each other. British sentiment was at the same time almost as badly divided as American. No assertion could be more inaccurate than that the British in general favored the South. There was a large and influential body of Southern sympathizers, moved by the conviction that the secession rested on a just claim to independence and self-government. There was an equally

convinced body of Northern sympathizers, moved by hatred of slavery and hope that it would be extinguished. In both these bodies alike the prevailing expectation was, till late in the course of the struggle, that the disruption of the American Republic would be permanent. This expectation, rather than sympathy with the South, was the basis of Gladstone's declaration, proclaimed with such shocking indiscretion at Newcastle, that Jefferson Davis had created a nation, and of Edward A. Freeman's famous title-page, "History of Federal Government . . . to the Disruption of the United States." Satisfied that but one outcome was possible, the great mass of British sentiment watched with but the sightseer's interest the course of events through which the inevitable end was to be reached. This attitude was the substantial foundation of the government's policy of neutrality. The good faith of Palmerston and Russell in the assumption of this policy is now beyond question; the lack of entire success in its execution is equally clear. The South complained as bitterly as the North of British policy; only the victorious North got satisfaction. If the South had established its independence, Great Britain

might have had double grievances to settle for. As it was, she settled with more grace than could fairly be anticipated the cost of her errors in respect to the North. Whatever grounds she had for contesting the claims of the United States, her position was almost hopelessly weakened from the outset by the staring fact that the result of the American war was precisely that which highly respected leaders of British opinion had assumed to be impossible.

The Treaty of Washington of 1871, with the arbitrations that followed, signified the recognition by the other English-speaking peoples that the American Republic was a new and permanent species of political organism. It signified the acceptance of democracy as a respectable mode of national existence. It marked the transition in British politics from the régime of Whigs and Tories to that of Liberals and Conservatives, from Palmerston and Russell to Gladstone and Bright, from Aberdeen and Derby to Disraeli and Salisbury. Throughout the English-speaking world the democratic spirit was visibly transforming institutions. In the United Kingdom it gave the suffrage to a million hitherto excluded men of the working class, made education more

accessible to the poor, began the transfer of the land of Ireland from the aristocracy to the Irish tenant farmers. In the United States it raised four millions of negroes from chattel slavery to civil and political equality with their former masters. In Australia and British America it dominated in every respect the great expansion of these communities that characterized the period. The Dominion of Canada was established, to parallel on the north of the United States the development of free institutions across the continent. With whatever disparity of population and resources, the new Dominion exhibited as distinctly as its great neighbor the qualities of a progressive, independent, and self-sufficient democracy.

Our fourth period opens with friction between the two neighbors in North America. Both peoples were in the course of marvellous internal development. The two oceans were bound together by railways and the vast interior spaces of the continent were becoming peopled and prosperous on both sides of the astronomical line that alone marked them off as distinct. Along all the thousands of miles of this line no incident occurred to arouse the concern of the governments, but the tide-water

at each end of it was in the eighties stirred with conflict. On the Atlantic the inshore fisheries again caused trouble; on the Pacific the fur-seals of Alaska. Both disputes were duly settled by rational administration and finally by arbitration. Then came the successive manifestations of American self-consciousness in connection with Samoa, Hawaii, Chile, Cuba. A restless, sensitive condition of the popular mind was discernible to an acute observer. The British Foreign Office for some reason failed to note this phenomenon. Likewise unnoticed was the coincidence of a high-strung and irritable chief executive at Washington with a cynical *quondam Saturday Review* essayist as foreign minister in Downing Street. The internal politics of both nations contributed conditions that favored an explosion, and the explosion duly occurred.

Cleveland's policy as to the Venezuelan boundary announced to the world, with seismic suddenness and violence, that the American democracy was of age. Its cherished Monroe Doctrine was declared the basis of much the same authority that European powers were assuming in Africa and Asia through the doctrines of *Hinterland* and "sphere of influence."

Once recovered from the shock caused by the occasion and manner of the announcement, the British Government and the British people were the first to recognize the new situation and to welcome it. The maintenance of peace and amity between the English-speaking nations became the goal of official and unofficial effort on both sides of the ocean. With the Spanish-American War came the convincing demonstrations of good feeling on the part of the British for the United States. From this event dates unbroken cordiality to the end of the hundred years of peace. Diplomacy, directly or through arbitration, settled all the old disputes that threatened tension. Progress was made toward the comprehensive substitution of pacific for warlike means in dealing with all kinds of controversies. Canada waxed great and prosperous on the frontier of the United States, and proclaimed an unmistakable purpose to remain the rival rather than become in any sense the appendage of the republic; Australia, New Zealand, South Africa developed into progressive democratic commonwealths; and all these powerful political societies moved steadily toward closer union with the United Kingdom in an earth-girdling federative em-

pire. Each step in the consolidation of this mighty structure has received in the United States the same degree of cordial approval that Great Britain displayed when the United States set forth on its imperialistic career among the ruins of the Spanish dominion.

The century of peace ends with the English-speaking world comprehended in two great political aggregates, differing much from each other in obvious characteristics, but permeated in the subtler arteries of their social life with forces that make for like feeling and like thinking. The same basic conceptions of democracy, liberty, and law prevail in both these organisms and determine the direction of conscious progress; the growing parallelism of economic conditions, the long-established financial and commercial relationships, the intimate solidarity of intellectual life, assure that the lines of unconscious progress will be the same in both. Everything seems to promise the absence of all but friendly rivalry in reciprocal benefits and in contribution to the welfare of the race.

Our historical review has shown that in the relation of the English-speaking peoples there has been much misconception, distrust, suspi-

cion, and general incompatibility of temper—that these peoples have been in a high degree human. But it has also shown that they have exhibited, on a steadily growing scale, that loftiest of human attributes—the will to adjust the frictions of social life by reason, the faculty that President Butler has so well designated, in its broadest aspect, as "the international mind." Our review has shown finally, if it has been adequate and truthful, that there has persisted in the consciousness of these peoples, often enough obscurely, but none the less certainly, the feeling that some special fiat of God and nature enjoins enduring peace among those whose blood or language or institutions or traditions, or all together, go back historically to the snug little island of Britain.

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